摘要
对食品企业社会责任规制建立委托代理模型,在此基础上分析了代理人努力水平可观测、不可观测等情况下的政府监管强度、政府监管的固定成本、食品企业努力成本系数、食品企业承担社会责任的风险规避程度对利益相关者期望效用的影响以及最优激励合同,同时还加入第三方因素考察政府关于食品企业社会责任规制对利益相关者期望效用的影响,并提出相应的政府对食品企业社会责任规制策略,为政府和企业决策提供借鉴。
The paper builds the principal-agent model for food enterprises. The paper also analyzes influence of the strength of government regulation and its fixed costs, the food enterprises＇ hardworking cost coefficient, the risk aversion for food enterprises under- taking the social responsibility for the expected utility of stakeholders and optimal incentive contract. Meanwhile, by adding the third party factor, the paper investigates the influence of the social responsibilities regulation of food enterprises for expected utility of stake- holders and puts forwards the related enterprises＇ social responsibilities regulation from government, offering the lessons for government and enterprises＇ decision-making.
出处
《科技与经济》
CSSCI
2013年第5期101-105,共5页
Science & Technology and Economy
关键词
食品企业
社会责任
规制
委托代理
food enterprises
social responsibility
regulation
principal-agent
