基于轮流出价模型的贷款定价与仿真模拟

The Loan Pricing and Simulation Basing on Bargaining Game Model

利率市场化后商业银行与企业在贷款定价中都拥有一定的定价权,因此在谈判中如何合理利用博弈规则谋求收益最大化是一个具有重要现实意义的研究课题。本文基于Rubinstein的轮流出价模型,分析了市场化条件下商业银行与企业间贷款利率的价格形成机制,求解了不同出价次序下的博弈模型结果并进行仿真模拟,认为贷款利率由双方博弈能力决定,且达成均衡的贷款定价受到商业银行与企业相对规模大小的影响。最后基于结论提出了适当增加规模,选择合适的议价对象等贷款定价建议。

With the liberalization of interest rate, both commercial banks and enterprises will have their own pricing power in the loan pricing to seek the profit maximization, so how to make use of the game theory properly in the negotiation is worth discussing. Basing on bargaining game model, this paper analyzed the pricing mecha- nism between commercial banks and enterprises. The results of the model show that the loan interested is deter- mined by gaming power of both sides. And the equalized price will be influenced by the relative sizes of commer- cial banks and enterprises. In conclusion, to reach a better pricing result, it is advisable to properly increase the scale and to choose an appropriate bargainer.