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基于博弈过程的企业激励问题研究

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摘要 随着博弈论应用领域的拓展。越来越多学者开始认识到企业的激励问题是一个动态的博弈过程。本文从激励中管理者和被管理者双方参与博弈的过程分析出发.提出了企业实施激励的几点启示。
作者 冯陈澄
出处 《商情》 2013年第46期20-20,共1页
关键词 激励 动态 博弈论
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