威廉姆斯与内格尔的道德运气思想及其计算机伦理价值

Study on Computer Ethics Based on Williams and Nagel's Moral Luck

威廉姆斯与内格尔的道德运气(Moral Luck)为计算机伦理问题的研究提供了一种全新的视角。究竟是否存在道德运气?若存在道德运气,是否会对康德式的传统伦理道德框架产生冲击?对这些问题的回应证实了伦理生活中道德运气存在的可能性。计算机哲学是由逻辑的易变性为基础而进行展开的,由于其逻辑的可塑性、易变性(Logical Malleability)给伦理学研究的特殊领域即计算机伦理带来了更多的复杂性、不可靠性、不确定性,正因为这些不确定性最终导致了所谓伦理道德上的"真空"(Vacuum),同时,这也为道德运气在计算机伦理学得以存在提供了有力的论据。道德运气担负着最为重要的职业责任概念及责任的归属。客观地审视及运用道德运气去看待计算机伦理中的道德运气现象,对于研究计算机伦理中风险、责任、义务、价值问题具有一定的时代意义。

Williams and Nagel＇s moral luck for the computer ethics research provides a new perspective. Whether there is moral luck？ If there is moral luck, can it pose a challenge to the Kantian＇s moral framework？ The response to the ＇above demonstrates ethical life exist moral luck. Computer philosophy is based on logical malleabihty and lead to ~me problems of moral vacuum. Moral issues are given that the vary nature of computer technology, its ＂logical malleability＂, leads to greater levels of complexity, unreliability and uncertainty. Moral luck bears the most important concepts of professional and attribution of responsibility. The problem of moral luck in computer ethics should prompt us a new way of looking at risk, accountability and re- sponsibility.