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纵向交易合约理论研究进展 被引量:3

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摘要 纵向结构和建立在交易合约基础上的纵向关系,是生活中最为普遍的经济现象之一,也是产业组织理论和微观经济理论研究的核心领域。上世纪70年代后,以信息技术为代表的新技术革命极大地推动了商品零售技术的发展,有效地减少了交易环节,大大降低了产品的销售成本。期间,跨国零售巨头(如沃尔玛、家乐福等)的崛起,改变了长期以来上游生产商(供应商)相对于下游零售商更具有市场力量的格局,上下游企业之间的交易合约和纵向控制行为也日益复杂。本文将对纵向交易合约理论的研究成果和进展进行梳理,着重讨论新世纪以来纵向交易合约研究的进展,以及各种纵向交易合约的形式与社会福利的关系。
作者 董烨然
出处 《经济学动态》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第10期132-142,共11页 Economic Perspectives
基金 2011年度北京市属高等学校人才强教深化计划项目(PHR201108341) 北京市哲学社会科学规划项目(11JGB073)对本文的资助
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参考文献72

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二级参考文献24

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