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联合风险投资的契约机制设计与欺诈风险防范——基于动态博弈的仿真实验研究

Mechanism Design in Syndicated Venture Investment and Fraud Risk Prevention Empirical Study based on Dynamic Game
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摘要 多个投资者联合起来共享收益和分摊风险,是进一步壮大我国风险投资业、为科技创新提供市场化支持的必要途径,但也因此带来其中个体投资者发生道德风险的问题。本文针对道德风险中最常见的欺诈风险,分析了资源整合、监管分工、风险分摊和潜在竞争的作用,并采用动态博弈的方法对联合风险投资中的欺诈风险发生进行建模分析。依据通过数值模拟的方法对主要影响因素进行的仿真研究,探讨了相关契约机制的设计原则,为降低欺诈风险概率提供了规律性建议。 Several investors take resource conformity as the main manner to affect operating risk in syndicated venture investment system. On this basis, this paper analyzes the function of resource conformity, supervision division, risks apportion and potential competition in view of fraud risk, and uses dynamic game method to modeling the fraud risk's occurrence. Then also discuss the relative principle of mechanism design in syndicated venture capital investment depending on the empirical study of core factors by numerical simulation.
作者 尚庆琛
出处 《上海经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第10期57-63,共7页 Shanghai Journal of Economics
关键词 联合风险投资 资源整合 欺诈风险 声誉 Syndicated Venture Investment Resource Conformity Fraud Risk Reputation
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参考文献6

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