进口促进、出口限制与战略性贸易利益

Import Promotion,Export Restriction and Gains from Strategic Trade

进口促进、出口限制的反向贸易政策成为当今贸易摩擦的新起因。中美两国在稀有资源贸易中的摩擦即是最好的例证。战略性贸易利益不仅包括取得规模经济、垄断利润等传统贸易利益,还包括产业链控制力、资源可持续性利用、国家经济安全等新型贸易利益。本文在三国局部均衡框架下,建立多阶段博弈模型,通过对进口促进与出口限制政策共存、仅存进口促进政策两种不同战略性贸易政策实施情形下国家福利变化的对比,分析新型战略性贸易利益的来源,并解释不同国家倾向采取不同战略性贸易政策以及贸易摩擦产生的原因。通过数据模拟分析,又进一步验证得到资源丰富国家倾向于实施出口限制的贸易政策、资源稀缺国家倾向于实施进口促进和抵制出口限制政策的贸易政策的结论。通过对中国稀土贸易争端的案例分析表明博弈模型对现实贸易摩擦的发生具有一定的解释能力。上述结论是对现有战略性贸易政策以及国际贸易摩擦理论研究的进一步扩展。

Reverse trade policies, such as import promotion and export restriction, have now become a new source of today＇ trade friction which is explicitly evidenced by Sino-US trade friction on scarce resource. Gains from strategic trade include traditional trade benefits like deriving economies of scale and monopolistic profit as well as new trade benefit like industrial chain control, sustainable use of resources and national economic security. Under partial equilibrium framework in three countries, this paper built a multi-stage game model to analyze welfare changes in cases of both Import-promotion and Export-restriction comparing to solely Import-promotion. It aims to explain the source and reasons of gains from strategic trade and different strategic trade policy implementation undertaken by nations, and how trade frictions occur accordingly. Based on data simulation, this study further examines that resource abundant countries tend to implement export restriction policy and resource scarce countries tend to implement import promotion policy. Case analysis of trade dispute of rare earth shows that the game model has certain ability to explain the actual trade friction. The above conclusion is believed as further extension of the existing strategic trade theory and international trade friction theory.