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带良好条件句的真理不动点理论(英文) 被引量:2

Adding Conditionals to a Fixed Point Theory of Truth
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摘要 各种真理不动点理论的一个主要问题在于:它们通常缺乏像样的条件句。本文旨在提出两种新的想法去处理这个问题。在介绍克里普克的真理不动点理论之后,本文的作者探讨了对真理不动点理论的种种反对意见,并回答了其中的一部分。然后,作者说明了菲尔德的真理理论,并说明该理论如何在克里普克的真理不动点理论至上增加了条件句。不过,本文的作者争论说,菲尔德的条件句仍有许多不尽理想之处。为了弥补这些缺点,作者提出了两个想法:一个是在不动点理论至上增加亚当斯条件句,另一个则是在其上增加史多内克条件句。 One of the main problems of fixed point theories of truth is that they usually lack a decent conditional; the paper proposes two new ways to fix this problem. After introducing Kripke's theory of truth, the author surveys some objections to fixed-point theories and responds to them. Afterwards, the author presents Field's theory of truth, which overcomes one of the main weaknesses of Kripke's theory of truth, namely that it lacks a decent conditional. The author claims, however, that there are also some problems with Field's account, and proposes two ideas of how to fix it: one adding Adams' conditionals whereas the other adding Stalnaker's conditionals.
作者 王文方
出处 《逻辑学研究》 CSSCI 2013年第3期16-29,共14页 Studies in Logic
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  • 1E. W. Adams, 1965, "A logic of conditionals", Inquiry, 8: 166-197.
  • 2E. W. Adams, 1975, The Logic of Conditionals, Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
  • 3S. Feferman, 1982, "Toward useful type-free theories, I", in R. L. Martin (ed.), Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, pp. 237-287, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • 4H. Field, 2008, Saving Truth from Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • 5A. Gupta, 1982, "Truth and paradox", Journal of Philosophical Logic, 11: 1-60, re- printed in R. L. Martin (ed.), Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, pp. 175- 235, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • 6A. Gupta, 1993, The Revision Theory of Truth, Cambridge: The MIT Press.
  • 7A. Gupta, 2001, "Truth", in L. Goble (ed.), The Blackwell guide to Philosophical Logic, pp. 90-114, Oxford: Blackwell.
  • 8S. A. Kripke, 1975, "Outline of a theory of truth", Journal of Philosophical Logic, 17: 225-278, reprinted in R. L. Martin (ed.), Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, pp. 53-81, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • 9R. L. Martin and P. W. Woodruff, 1975, "On representing 'Truth-in-L' in L", Philosophia, 3:213-217, reprinted in R. L. Martin (ed.), Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Para- dox, pp. 47-51, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • 10R. Stalnaker, 1991, "A theory of conditionals", in F. Jackson (ed.), Conditional, Ox- ford: Oxford University Press.

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