摘要
这篇文章尝试辩解布尔(亚里士多德式)逻辑中关于实质蕴涵的反直观定义。主要问题是:自然语言和逻辑定义的"蕴涵"的隐喻之间的联系是什么?为了更好地理解该定义和避免一些潜在的困惑,本文呈现出不同论点,并论述了"A→B"的经典定义的合理性。
This paper tries to justify the counter-intuitive definition of material implication in Boolean (Aristotelian) logic. The main question is: what is the link between the metaphor of "implication" in the natural language and its logical definition? Different arguments are presented in order to better understand the definition and avoid some potential confusion. As a conclusion it is shown that the only "acceptable" definition of A → B seems to be the classical one.
出处
《逻辑学研究》
CSSCI
2013年第3期81-87,共7页
Studies in Logic