期刊文献+

基于道德伦理的国美控制权之争分析

An Analysis of the Dispute on Control Right Allocation in Gome from the Perspective of Morality and Ethics
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摘要 现代公司治理的重要问题之一就是控制权的配置,陈晓和黄光裕两方在2010年国美电器的控制权争夺过程中除了资本和股权较量之外,抢占道德的制高点以获取投资者和媒体舆论的支持也是双方口诛笔伐攻击对方的重要手段。本文从道德伦理的角度分析陈晓和黄光裕双方的行为,比较了双方所声称的控制权配置模式所依据的公司治理理论,认为相对均衡的控制权配置应该保证股东和经理人的交易和收益分配具有激励兼容的特质,保证企业成员在追求各自利益的同时实现利他的共赢。但是,当前的控制权配置体现了股东和资本的意志,道义上的批判和道德责任不能决定控制权的配置,也不能仅仅凭借道德约束来建立现代企业制度和完善公司治理结构。 The control right allocation is one of the important issues in modem corporate governance. In the dispute of control right in Gome in 2010, besides stacking up against each other in capital and stock right, Chert Xiao and Huang Guangyu regarded seizing the moral high ground to gain supports from investors and media as an important means to de- feat each other. This paper analyzes Chen and Huang's behavior and compares the two different corporate governance the- ories they claimed from the moral and ethical perspective, and the results suggest that relatively balanced control right al- location should ensure that the trading and income distribution between shareholders and managers has the character of incentive compatible. As a result, enterprise members could achieve an all - win in the pursuit of their own interests. However, the control right allocation reflects the will of shareholders and capitals. The control right allocation cannot be decided by criticizing and responsibility from the moral and ethical perspective. Similarly, modem enterprise system can- not be established and corporate management structure cannot be perfected by ethical imperative.
机构地区 吉林大学商学院
出处 《商业研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第11期185-190,共6页 Commercial Research
基金 国家社科青年基金项目 项目编号:10CJL045
关键词 控制权 控制权配置 国美电器 道德伦理 公司治理 control right control right allocation Gome morality and ethics corporate governance
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