摘要
基于物流外包行为的交易频率,构建了一次性物流外包和重复性物流外包的道德风险演化博弈模型,分析了企业信誉和诚信交易的影响因素,指出物流外包活动中,合作双方是否诚信取决于所获利益、惩罚程度、信誉差异、交易机率以及交易次数,并说明了研究结论的现实意义。
In this paper, in view of the frequency of the logistics outsourcing businesses, we established the moral risk evolution game model for one-off logistics outsourcing and repeated logistics outsourcing, analyzed the factors influence enterprise reputation and honest trade, and pointed oi^t that honest cooperation of the two parties in logistics outsourcing relied largely on the benefit generated, penalty level, reputation difference, transaction probability and number of transaction.
出处
《物流技术》
北大核心
2013年第10期89-91,225,共4页
Logistics Technology
基金
国家级课题"新疆对俄白哈经济一体化市场的投资风险评价及管控对策研究"(12XJJCGJW001)
关键词
物流外包
信誉
道德风险
演化博弈
logistics outsourcing
reputation
moral risk
evolutionary game