中国企业海外投资的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Chinese Enterprises' Outward Direct Investment

通过构建国企与私企海外投资的演化博弈模型,运用Matlab软件进行计算机仿真的结果显示:如果70%的国企对外直接投资,那么无论起初有多少私企对外直接投资,随着时间的推进,私企都会采取对外直接投资策略。如果有30%的国有企业对外直接投资,那么起初如果有40%以上的私企采取对外直接投资策略,随着时间的推进,私企都会采取对外直接投资策略;而起初如果只有10%的私企对外直接投资,那么随着时间的推进,私企都不采取对外直接投资策略。境外企业实现收入越多,趋向于采取对外直接投资策略的速度越快。起初如果私企进行海外直接投资的额外收益小于付出的额外成本,随着时间的推进,无论初始企业海外直接投资比例如何,均收敛于不进行海外直接投资。起初如果私企进行海外直接投资的额外收益等于付出的额外成本,随着时间的推进,初始企业海外直接投资比例低于40%的收敛于不进行海外直接投资。最后提出实现长期均衡的战略建议。

Compared with China ODI scale and increment, the benefits from outward direct investment de- serve more attention. Simulation by MATLAB on the basis of an evolutionary game model shows that if 70% state-owned enterprises （SOEs） engage in ODI, non-SOEs will follow suit irrespective of initial amount of non-SOEs ODI. Whereas if 30% SOEs engage in ODI, non-SOEs will follow suit only when 40% non-SOEs implement initial ODI. And non-SOEs will not invest outward if initial non-SOEs ODI is less than 10%. The more revenues from outward investment, the more rapid adoption of ODI strategy is realized. If initially less than 40% enterprises invest outward and non-SOEs initial revenues from ODI equal extra cost, convergence is to no ODI. Finally, suggestions are put forward.