摘要
针对长期契约中的重复道德风险问题,在考虑了代理人时间偏好的基础上建立三阶段的激励模型,探索动态不一致性对长期契约的影响.结果表明:动态不一致性不改变长期契约的记忆性,即代理人当前的高产出将对后续阶段其自身报酬产生积极的影响;动态不一致性改变了长期契约各阶段之间的鞅性质,第一阶段的最优效用小于第二、第三阶段效用的期望值.
With the repeated moral hazard of long-term contracts aimed at and the agent of time preference taken into account, a three-period incentive model was developed and the impact of dynamic inconsistency on long-term contracts was then explored. The results showed that dynamic inconsistency does not change the memorability of long-term contracts, i. e. the high output at the current stage will positively affect the agent＇s payoff in the later periods; dynamic inconsistency does change the martingales of different periods, and the agent~ optimal utility in Period 1 is less than the expected value in Period 2 and Period 3.
出处
《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2013年第11期1665-1668,共4页
Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)
基金
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(N120306001)
关键词
动态不一致性
长期契约
重复道德风险
委托代理问题
鞅
dynamic inconsistency
long-term contract
repeated moral hazard
principal-agentissue
martingale
