政治关联影响我国上市公司长期绩效的三大效应

Three Effects of Political Connections on Long-term Performances of the Chinese Firms after IPOs

政治关联能否带来上市公司股票的长期超额回报?Fan et al.(2007)认为政治关联带来的是业绩的减损和长期负回报,但是于蔚等(2012)提出了不尽相同的观点。综述政治关联文献,本文提出了社会负担效应、产权保护效应和政府偏袒效应三大假说。分析我国上市公司的面板数据,本文发现政治关联有助于提高我国上市公司的长期绩效。进一步研究发现,政治关联的长期正回报主要来源于民营企业,政治关联和上市公司长期绩效的关系在国有控股企业中并不显著。政治关联的作用机理是,在国有控股企业中,政治关联不仅引致政府偏袒,而且带来社会负担;在民营控股企业中,政治关联不但有助于产权保护,而且有助于获得政府的关照。因此,政治关联影响了公平竞争,产生着新型的"政企不分"。

Can political connections improve the long-term performance of the firms after public listing？ Fan et al. （2007） find that political connections bring about the negative returns in the long run in China, but it is inconsistent with the arguments of Yu et al. （2012）. Based on the literature of political connections, we suggest the theoretical framework of social burdens, property protections and government partialities for the relationship between political connections and corporate performance. With the panel data of the Chinese public listed firms, we find that political connections can improve corporate performance in the long run, which comes from the firms controlled by families instead of government- controlled firms. We further find that political connections of the family-controlled firms result in not only property protections, but also better access to bank loans, tax rebates, and government subsidies. We argue that government patronage associated with political connections gets the market twisted.