基于非对称信息博弈理论的中小企业融资问题研究

Research on Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Funding Problems Based on the Asymmetric Information Game Theory

根据融资次序理论,分析我国中小企业融资的主要途径来源于商业银行贷款。根据国内学者从三个视角研究我国中小企业融资问题,建立非对称信息下中小企业与商业银行的演化博弈模型,用数学方法论证了中小企业在一次性贷款状况下不还款的概率大的经济现象;通过非对称信息下混合策略的概率分析,提出了满足商业银行和中小企业的演化博弈混合策略模型理想博弈精炼Nash均衡的条件公式。

According to the financing order theory, this paper would analyze financing from the main way of commercial bank loan about the small-and-medium enterprises. According to the domestic scholars＂ study on financing problems from three perspectives, the evolutionary game model of small and medium-sized enterprises and commercial banks under the asymmetric information is established, and demonstrates that the probability of not reimbursement under the one-time loan conditions is big; through the analysis of asymmetric infolxnation under the probability of the hybrid strategy, it puts the condition formula of evolutionary game hybrid strategy model ideal game rpfiuin~, Nn^h h^l~n~