流域污染治理中的演化博弈稳定性分析

Stability Analysis of the Evolutionary Game of River Valley's Pollution Treatment

在流域污染问题中,上游的排污群体、政府监管方和下游的受害群体是污染治理的三方博弈参与主体。在忽略污染的循环经济概念前提下,建立了描述三方演化博弈的动态复制方程。研究表明:政府监管方处于主导地位,下游群体处于从属地位,上游群体的策略行为几乎完全由政府监管方的决策行为所决定。因此,环境质量决定于政府的行为。

For the river valley＇s pollution treatment, there are three participants, namely upstream group with pollution discharge, government regulator, and downstream group of victims. Ignoring circulatory economy, the three-party replicator dynamic equations of the evolutionary game are formulated. The results show that the government regulator holds a leading position, downstream group of victims holds a following position. The strategic behavior of the upstream group depends on behavior of the government regulator. In a word, environmental quality is determined mainly by government ~s action in pollution prevention.