投资者保护、公司特征与控制权配置

Investor Protection,Corporate Characteristics and Allocation of Control Rights

本文利用2005—2010年中国上市公司数据，从股东权力视角研究公司控制权配置的影响因素。实证检验发现：地区投资者保护水平对大股东控制权的影响会由于公司性质不同而存在差异，在国有控股公司中，地区投资者保护水平直接对股东控制权存在正向影响，而非国有控股公司中地区投资者保护水平与公司政治关联程度共同影响股东控制权。在行业竞争度低的公司中，投资者保护水平与大股东控制权的影响显著为正，但这种影响在行业竞争度高的公司中并不明显。

Using Chinese listed companies date from 2005 -2010, this paper investigates factors that affect the alloca- tion of corporate control rights. Empirical tests find shareholders＇ control rights due to the different types that： regional investor protection has different effects on the large of the companies. In state-owned companies, regional investor protec- tion has direct and positive impact on shareholders＇ control rights; while in non-state-owned companies regional investor protection and corporate political connection mutually influence shareholders＇ control rights. In lowly competitive industry companies, investor protection has significantly positive effect on obvious in highly competitive industry companies control rights of large shareholders, but the effect is not