政治关联、盈余质量与权益资本成本

Political Connections,Earnings Quality and Cost of Equity Capital

本文运用剩余收益折现模型,从权益资本成本视角,实证检验了政治关联对盈余质量资产定价功能的影响。研究发现,盈余质量具有定价功能,提高盈余质量,能够降低权益资本成本;但是,盈余质量在投资者资产定价决策中的作用主要表现在无政治关联公司,政府对政治关联企业的保护效应降低了其系统性风险,部分替代了投资者在资产定价时对高质量盈余的需求。进一步分析表明,相比于国家控股公司,政治关联对民营上市公司盈余质量定价功能的替代效应更加显著。本研究揭示了政治关联影响资本市场资源配置效率的路径,为我们理解上市公司盈余质量的投资者保护效果提供了新的解释。

Based on empirical data of China＇s listed firms and by using discounted residual income model to estimate cost of equity capital, this paper investigates the impact of political connections on the usefulness of earnings quality in asset pricing. We find that earnings quality is negatively related to the cost of equity capital. But the role of earnings quality in the investors＇ asset pricing decisions is only useful in firms without political connections. The protective effects of the government on political connected firm decrease its systematic risk and further reduce the investors＇ demand of high quality earnings in asset pricing decisions. Also, we find that the substitution effect of political connections on the usefulness of earnings quality in asset pricing is more significant in private listed firms than in state owned firms. This paper disclosesthe mechanisms of how political connections affect the resource allocation in capital market.