摘要
对地方政府官员的激励安排是影响中国经济社会发展的重要方面.本文关注中国省级正职和副职官员评价晋升体系中的经济因素、非经济因素和个人特征因素,以及在不同级别官员中这些因素相对重要性的差异.通过对1978年至2008年全国31个省、直辖市、自治区历届省级正职和副职官员职位变更观测的计量分析,发现官员任内辖区经济增长业绩对较低级别官员的晋升概率比对较高级别官员具有更强的影响,而较高级别官员的升迁则相对更多地受非经济因素的影响.这一实证证据表明,从评价机制的变化上看,改革开放以来我国政府官员职务任免民主化程度的提升更多地体现在较低级别的官员上.
Official promotion incentives have been playing a vital role in Chinese economic development. This paper focuses on not only the effects of economic factors, non-economic factors and individual characteristics on the likelihood of promotion of local officials, but also the differences of relative importance of these factors across provincial top leaders and vice leaders. Using a turnover dataset of provincial top leaders and vice leaders of 31 provinces between 1978 and 2008, this paper argues that economic performances have a stronger impact on the likelihood of promotion of provincial vice leaders than that of top leaders, for which non-economic factors is more important. The empirical evidence shows that China has made greater progresses in the democratization of personnel control of junior officers than in that of senior officers since the reform and opening-up.
出处
《管理科学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第11期55-68,共14页
Journal of Management Sciences in China
关键词
中国经济
经济增长
官员评价机制
Chinese economy
economic growth
official evaluation mechanism