摘要
首先简要地介绍了经济学上的委托 -代理理论 ,然后从委托人的角度出发 ,对委托 -代理模型中的监督问题进行了研究 ,探讨了委托人为了获得更多有关代理人的信息所需花费的最优监督成本 。
This article introduces briefly the economic theory of principal-agent problems at first.Then,from the sight of principal,the author studies the problem of supervision about the principal-agent model,probes into the best cost of supervision that the principal should spend in order to own more information about agent,explains and uses the theory by some examples.
出处
《南京邮电学院学报》
2000年第4期70-72,共3页
Journal of Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Natural Science)
关键词
数学模型
监督成本
经济学
委托-代理理论
Principal-agent
Mathematical model
Cost of supervision
The best benefits
