基于长期业绩度量的我国配股管制有效性研究

The Effectiveness in Regulation of Rights Issues: Evidence on Long-run Performance

笔者结合我国特殊的制度背景,研究配股管制对我国证券市场资源配置的有效性。将我国配股管制的有效性细分为直接作用和间接作用,从长期市场业绩和会计业绩系统考察我国配股管制的有效性及其演进效应。研究发现,我国的配股管制总体上是有效的,其直接作用和间接作用都发挥了效果。进一步研究表明,我国配股管制的直接作用和间接作用都有逐步加强的趋势,存在随时间推移的演进效应,同时,我国配股管制的间接作用相对于其直接作用而言表现出一定的柔弱和缓慢。这为理解我国配股管制的作用和投资者保护提供了新的发现和经验证据。

The paper investigates the effectiveness of the regulation of rights issues in terms of direct and indirect effect, during the two different regulation periods, 1999 -2000 and 2001 -2002. The evidence indicates that based on the accounting and stock performance after announcement of rights issue proposal approved by the board, China＇ s regulation of rights issues is generally approximately effec- tive as the direct and indirect effect of the regulation, and the regulation of rights issue is stricter and more effective over time.