基于博弈视角的农村信用体系建设策略研究——以农户小额信贷为例

Study on the Tactics of Rural Credit System from the Viewpoint of Game Theory——A Case Study of Rural Micro-Credit

建设农村信用体系能减少融资主体的信息不对称,防止逆向选择和道德风险,降低双方交易成本,提高市场效率。以农户小额信贷为例,通过建立博弈模型,分析市场无监管和有监管条件下,博弈双方的策略选择,进而分析影响达到帕累托最优的因素。研究显示:提高小额贷款机构追讨贷款成功的概率(P),降低小额贷款机构发放贷款支付的成本(C1)和为追回贷款所付出的成本(C2),提高农户因违约被追讨所受到的惩罚(C3)有利于达到帕累托最优。据此,提出推进农村信用体系建设的政策建议。

The establishment of rural credit system can reduce financing body＇s information asymmetry, preventing adverse selection and moral hazard, reducing both parties＇ transaction cost and improve market efficiency. This paper takes farmer＇s microfinance as an example, through the establishment of game model to analyze both party＇s strategy selection under no market supervision and under market supervision, and to analyze factors that affect the reach of Pareto Optimal. The study shows that improve the probability（P） of microfinauce institutions to recover the loan, reduce the microfinance institution＇s cost（C1） to give out loans, cost （C2） to recover loan, increase the penalty of contract breach （C3） is conducive to the reach of Pareto Optimal. Accordingly, this paper presents policy recommendations to promote the rural credit system.