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适应性效率理论与公司法的适应性——以创业投资为样本的研究 被引量:5

Adaptive Efficiency Theory and the Adaptability of Corporate Law: Base on the Sample of Venture Capital
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摘要 从公司法的角度看,美国公司法律规则及制度环境应对风险问题的立场和方法推动了创业投资事业的成功,其鼓励、促成尝试和冒险的品性迎合了创业企业的需要。在公司法学视域中,对于怎样有效回应公司面对的不确定性,进而推进创业与创新这一问题,适应性效率理论具有独到的解释力和评价力。与代理成本理论相比,它转换了公司股权结构的生成背景,重置了优先股的功能定位,摆脱了"对赌协议"效力判断中纠缠于利益冲突的裁判思维,伸张了金融创新中的契约自治。它将制度工具的设计、利害关系的考量融入公司的动态发展过程,使制度成为公司参与方共同风险事业的助推力量。 From the perspective of corporate law,the success of venture capital can be attributed to the way how to deal with risk according to rules and regulations as well as their institutional background in the U. S. Its quality of fostering adventure caters to the demand of start-ups. As to the issue of how corporate law corresponds with the uncertainty that corporate business faces effectively thus facilitating venture and innovation,adaptive efficiency theory in corporate legal scholarship has unique explanatory and evaluative power. Compared to the agency cost theory,it switches the generating background of corporate share structure,replaces the functional position of preferred stock,breaks away from the manner of judicial thinking in the judgment for the validity of valuation adjustment mechanism which is entangled with conflicts of inter-est,and upholds freedom of contract in financial innovation. It places the design of institutional tools as well as the consideration of stakes in the dynamic process of corporate development,thus making the institution as the impetus for the common venture of corporate participants.
作者 于莹 潘林
出处 《吉林大学社会科学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第6期86-92,175-176,共7页 Jilin University Journal Social Sciences Edition
基金 山东大学自主创新基金资助(2012GN033) 中国博士后科学基金面上资助(2012M521309)
关键词 适应性效率 创业投资 风险 代理成本 优先股 对赌协议 venture capital,risk,agency cost,adaptive efficiency,preferred stock,VAM(valuation adjustment mechanism)
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参考文献12

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二级参考文献11

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