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家族企业双重委托代理与CEO薪酬激励 被引量：1

Dual Principal-agent Problem and CEO Compensation in Family Firms
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摘要 家族企业不仅存在所有者与管理层的第一重代理关系,亦存在控股家族与小股东间的第二重代理关系。CEO薪酬激励作为公司治理机制之一,必然对此有所反映。本文立足代理理论和管理理论视角,以非家族企业CEO的薪酬作为比较基准,探讨了双重委托代理问题对CEO薪酬的影响,同时也阐述了家族企业独立董事、机构投资者对CEO薪酬的影响效应。最后,对研究进行了评述并讨论了未来的研究方向。 Family firms face two sides of principal-agent problem;one is agency problems between shareholders and managers,and the other agency problem between large shareholder and minority shareholders.This result should have extensive repercussions on CEO compensation contract,one of the corporate governance mechanisms.From the perspective of agency theory and stewardship theory,this paper discusses the influence on CEO compensation from dual principal-agent problem,outsider directors and institutional investors in family firms,on the benchmark of CEO compensation in non-family firms.Then,we review and point out the research direction in the future.
作者 陈家田 唐德善
机构地区 河海大学商学院 安徽大学商学院
出处 《学术界》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第11期97-103,102-103+309,共7页 Academics
基金 安徽省哲学社会科学规划项目"中小民营家族企业双重委托代理研究"(项目编号:AHSK11-12D41)
关键词 家族企业 CEO薪酬 双重委托代理 family firms CEO compensation dual principal-agent problem
分类号 F276.5 [经济管理—企业管理] F272.92 [经济管理—企业管理]
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参考文献27

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二级参考文献22

共引文献162

同被引文献12

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  • 8方军雄.我国上市公司高管的薪酬存在粘性吗?[J].经济研究,2009,44(3):110-124. 被引量：767
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  • 10冯根福,冯祥英,刘志勇.我国上市公司CEO薪酬存在租金攫取吗?[J].经济管理,2011,37(1):29-37. 被引量：10

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学术界
2013年 第11期

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