基于进化博弈的生态建筑项目开发商群体行为研究

Research of Developers Behavior Based on Evolutionary Game Theory in Developing Ecological Buildings

以进化博弈理论为基础,构建了开发商群体在生态建筑项目开发决策中的动态博弈模型,打破了经典博弈理论中参与人完全理性的不合理假定。模型充分讨论了政府激励措施对开发商行为的影响,其结果较好地解释了因信息不对称造成的我国生态建筑项目"市场失灵"现象,为合理引导开发商进行生态建筑项目建设提供了决策依据。

On the basis of evolutionary game theory, this paper constructed a dynamic game model of real estate developers＇ decision- making in the process of developing ecological architecture projects, and tried to break the unreasonable supposition that participators were totally rational in the classic game theory. This model adequately discussed how government incentives affected the developers＇ behavior, which explained finally in a better way the ＂market failure＂ phenomenon among ecological architectures made by asymmetric information in China and may provide a theoretical basis for the government when reasonably guiding developed to developing ecological architectures.