基于演化博弈的环境监管与排污企业治理行为研究

Environmental Supervision and Pollution Emission Enterprises' Administrations Based on the Evolutionary Game

为研究环境监管机构的监管力度、监管执行力以及监管技能掌握程度等要素对排污企业环境治理行为演化的影响,借助演化博弈理论方法,建立了环境监管机构和排污企业群体之间的支付矩阵,研究了不同情形下二者行为交互系统均衡点的存在和稳定性,并用数值仿真展示了决策参数的不同取值对演化结果的影响。研究发现:这些影响二者行为的要素作用的大小会影响均衡点的个数及其稳定性,均衡点会在源点、汇点和鞍点之间变化;分析表明排污企业违法排污的额外收益过高,环境监管机构不坚持严格监管等因素都会使系统向不良状态演化,最终会"锁定"在这一不良状态;并讨论了系统向良好状态演化和跳出不良"锁定"的条件,同时为宏观调控者提出了相应的政策性建议。

In order to research the impact of some factors including supervision degree,supervision execution,mastery of the supervision skill of the environmental supervision institutions on the administrations of subject in the pollution emission enterprises,a payment matrix between the environmental supervision institution and the pollution emission enterprises by the methods of evolutionary game was built,and the equilibrium points and their stability at different conditions were discussed,the parametric diversity of decision-making on evolution result by numerical simulation was made. It was found that the size of the factors’ function would affect the number and stability of equilibrium points,and each equilibrium would be outflow point,inflow point,or saddle point,and change between them. The research revealed that if the pollution emission enterprises can obtain too high income from illegally polluting,or the supervision degree of the environmental supervision institutions was low,the system may evolve to bad＂locked＂state,and also the condition that the system made for good state and jump out of the bad＂locked＂state was discussed,and some policy suggestions for macro-controllers was proposed as well.