胡塞尔意向主义中的实质内容

Reeller Inhalt in Husserl's Intentionalism

胡塞尔一般被视为所谓"意向主义"的代表人物,即:主张意向性是意识的基本特性或结构,意识总是关系于一对象。这种说法当然不是没有道理。但是,如果我们因此以为,对于胡塞尔而言,在一个意识状态之中,所有意识内容都是意向内容,这却是一种误解。因为,根据胡塞尔的意向性理论,在每一种心理行为之中,除了意向内容之外,还总包括一种非意向的意识内容。这种非意向的意识内容,胡塞尔称为"实质内容"。文章以胡塞尔对感知行为的分析为基础,探讨"实质内容"这个概念在胡塞尔的意向性理论中的位置;并指出,胡塞尔认为在意识内容中包括实项内容的想法,并不十分具有说服力,而这将对他的整个意向性理论带来重大的影响。

Edmund Husserl is generally regarded as a representative of intentionalism, claiming that intentionality is the basic structure of consciousness and that consciousness is always directed at an object. This general opinion is, of course, not without substance, but it does not mean that for Husserl all conscious content is intentional. For, according to Husserl＇s theory of intentionality, there are always two kinds of conscious content in a mental state, one intentional and the other nonintentional. The non-intentional content of a mental state Husserl calls ＂reeller Inhalt＂. The present essay attempts to give, mainly on the basis of Husserl＇s analysis of the act of perception, an account of Husserl^s concept of ＂reeller Inhalt＂ and show that it is very questionable whether there is really such conscious content in our perception. And if the concept of ＂reeller Inhalt＂ is unfounded, then not only Husserl＇s theory of perception but also his entire theory of intentionality will be compromised.