清政府善灾决策形成机制研究——以乾隆五十三年荆州大水为例

Study on Decision-making Mechanism after Disasters in the Qing Dynasty——Taking A Flood in Jingzhou in Fifty-three Years of Emperor Qianlong As A Case

本文以乾隆五十三年的荆州大水为例,通过分析中央和地方官员围绕水灾原因的争论和水利决策的形成过程,来探讨有清一代政府在水旱灾害过程中的决策形成机制,以此表明清代善灾决策的形成并非建立在制度化的信息搜集上,而是依靠政府官员的主观判断、情感取向和个人经验,而这些因素通常受到社会舆论和政治、经济等压力的影响,因此更多时候,善灾决策的形成并不是为了解决水旱问题,而是出于社会稳定和政治斗争的目的。而政府官员在水利决策过程中的信息缺失,暴露了清代荒政各种制度中对于信息搜集、监测和分析的缺失。

This article analyzes the decision-making mechanism after flood and drought disasters in the Qing Dynasty, based on a bad flood happened in Jingzhou in fifty-three years of Emperor Qianlong （the year of 1788）. It shows that the decision-making is not based on systematic information collections, but on official＇s subjective judgment and personal experiences, which are liable to be affected by public opinions, political and eco- nomic factors. This article also points out the lack of information gathering, monitoring and analysis of famine relief in the Qing Dynasty.