管理层权力、政治联系与会计稳健性——来自民营上市公司的经验证据

Management power, political ties and accounting conservatism, with empirical envidence from private listed companies

本文利用2007—2010年间我国民营上市公司的相关数据，实证检验了管理层权力、政治联系对会计稳健性的影响。研究结果表明，民营上市公司的会计稳健性总体偏弱，掏空动机降低了上市公司的会计稳健性；管理层权力越大，会计稳健性越低，高管长期在位对会计稳健性的影响更为显著，会计稳健性对亏损业绩的敏感性高于对盈利业绩的敏感性；没有足够证据表明政治联系明显降低了民营上市公司的会计稳健性，但是无政治联系的民营上市公司的会计稳健性要比有政治联系的上市公司的会计稳健性要高。

The article studies the influence of management power and political ties upon accounting conservatism, by analyzing the data related to private listed companies between 2007 and 2010. The study shows that: accounting conservatism in private listed companies is weak in general as it is reduced by pervasive tunneling motivation; accounting conservatism drops as the management power grows, especially when senior executives hold office for too long;accounting conservatism is more sensitive to losses than to profits; there is no sufficient evidence to suggest that political ties could distinctly affect accounting conservatism, but that in companies without political ties is higher than that in companies with political ties.