食品安全问题的动态博弈分析

Analysis on Dynamic Game Theory in the Food Safety Problems

消费者与食品生产经营厂商之间的博弈模型说明:若消费者不举报,则食品生产经营厂商就会倾向于制售伪劣食品;而在消费者举报的情况下,若食品生产经营厂商制售伪劣食品的期望净收益大于零,则食品生产经营厂商就制售伪劣食品,反之,则相反;若消费者举报行为的期望净收益大于零,则消费者就会举报;反之,则相反。鼓励消费者举报,以遏制食品生产经营厂商制售伪劣食品行为,就要加大对不法食品生产经营厂商的惩处力度、最大限度地压缩其机会主义行为作祟的空间;最大限度地降低消费者的举报成本并提高对消费者的赔偿额度;建立健全食品安全监管组织体系及消费者举报受理机制以使食品安全问题得到及时有效的处理。

The game model between consumers and manufacturers producing or marketing food shows that： if consumers don＇t denounce the fake and low-quality food, they would tend to produce or market them; if consumers do denounce, and the expected net earnings for faking or selling inferior food which is greater than zero, they will do the same, conversely, the opposite; if the expected net earnings of the behavior of denouncing is greater than zero, consumers will implement this behavior, conversely, the opposite. Encouraging consumers＇ report in order to contain the behavior of producers, the actions must be taken as follows： increasing the punishment to compress their opportunism behavior space maximally; maximally reducing the cost of consuemers＇ accusation, and improving the compensation to the consumers; establishing and perfecting a food safety supervision organization system and the mechanism accepting consumers＇ denunciation in order to make food safety problems be treated timely and effectively.