国资控股、管理层权力与职务消费

State Ownership,Managerial Power and Perks

通过手工收集我国沪深A股上市公司年报附注中披露的高管职务消费数据,实证研究管理层权力对国资控股公司职务消费的作用机制,以及影响这一作用机制的内部治理机制和外部制度环境两个维度的因素。研究发现,相对于非国资控股公司而言,国资控股公司管理层的职务消费更高;管理层权力越大,国资控股公司管理层的职务消费越高;股权制衡度越高,国资控股上市公司管理层权力与高管职务消费之间正相关关系越强;在市场化水平较高的地区,国资控股上市公司管理层权力与职务消费之间的正相关关系更弱。

Based on the information of perks disclosed in annual reports and their annotations of A-Stock listed companies in Shenzhen ＆ Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2010, this thesis empirically analyses the effect of managerial power on perks of managers, and the effect of internal governance mechanisms and external institutional environment on the relationship between managerial power and perks of managers. It reveals： compared to the non-state-owned holding companies, state-owned holding company management have higher perks; the greater the managerial power, the more the state-owned holding company management perks; the higher the degree of ownership balance, the stronger the positive correlation between managerial power and perks in state-owned holding listing companies; the higher the marketing level, the weaker the positive correlation between managerial power and perks of managers in state-owned holding listing companies.