双边道德风险下收益共享契约的博弈决策分析

Analysis on Game Decision-making with Double Moral Hazard Based on Revenue Sharing Contract

在销售商风险规避且存在双边道德风险的假设下,基于CVaR风险度量准则,考察了供应商和销售商联合促销报童类商品的订购和促销决策,并在此基础上讨论了收益共享契约的协调问题。定义了余货概率,指出销售商的订购决策是基于最优余货概率做出的,而供应商和销售商的促销决策是基于边际收益等于边际成本的原则确定的。在收益共享契约下,证明了供应链联合促销博弈存在一个纳什均衡。分析了收益共享契约参数和销售商风险规避系数对渠道成员决策的影响。讨论了收益共享契约的协调性,得到以下研究结论:在双边道德风险下,收益共享契约不能协调供应链。文中主要结论使用数值分析进行了验证。

Based on CVaR risk measure criterion, this paper examines ordering and promotion decision- making of a supply chain, in the presence of double moral hazard, with a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer who promote jointly to sell newsboy goods. It also discusses whether revenue sharing contract can coordinate supply chains. Residual commodity probability, the probability of the market demand being smaller than the ordering quantity, is defined. It points out that the optimal ordering quantity is determined by the optimal residual commodity probability, while channel member＇s optimal promotional effort makes marginal revenue equal to marginal cost. It also proves that there exists a Nash equilibrium in joint promotion game under revenue sharing contract. Besides, it makes sensitivity analysis on how revenue sharing contract parameters and risk aversion coefficient of the retailer affect the channel member＇s the optimal decision-making. At last, this paper investigates coordination problem of revenue sharing contract and it concludes that revenue sharing contract cannot coordinate a supply chain in the presence of double moral hazard. The main conclusions are verified by numerical analysis.