U-Auction:面向真实利用率的频谱拍卖机制

U-Auction:Real Utilization Based Truthful Auction Mechanism for Dynamic Spectrum Access

在频谱拍卖机制设计中,最关键的挑战是在满足主用户的利益及次用户的频谱需求的同时提高频谱利用率。然而,如果某些次用户通过抬高出价以获得多于他真实需求的频谱资源,采用现有频谱拍卖机制可能会导致较低的真实频谱利用率。通过引入真实频谱利用率,提出了一个新的频谱拍卖机制来解决这类问题。该拍卖机制为拍卖者提供了一个在真实频谱利用率及社会福利/收入间取得权衡的机制,设计了多项式时间复杂度的针对单信道及多信道的诚信拍卖算法。实验表明,该拍卖机制可以极大地提高真实频谱利用率。

The key challenge in the spectrum auction design is how to efficiently improve the spectrum utilization, which requires leveraging the profit of primary users and the spectrum requirements of secondary users. However, existing spectrum auctions always cause low real spectrum utilization, if some secondary users prefer to monopolize the secondary spectrum access right with high bids which is inconsistent with their true spectrum requirements. To address this problem, through integrating real spectrum utilization, this paper presents a novel real spectrum utili- zation based auction mechanism named U-Auction. This paper provides a framework for auctioneer to leverage the tradeoff between real spectrum utilization and social welfare/revenue. This paper also designs polynomial-time truthful spectrum auction mechanisms to support the auction optimization for both single and multiple channels allocation scenarios in U-Auction. Simulation results show that U-Auction can significantly improve the real spectrmn utilization.