监督认证,还是市场力量?——风险投资对创业板公司IPO折价影响的实证研究

Certification,Monitoring or Market Power?Effects of VC on IPO underpricing in China GEM

本文考察在我国深圳创业板市场中,风险投资如何影响企业首次公开发行折价,并得到与前期大多数研究不同的结论。本文构造"相对发行市盈率"(RPPE)指标并研究发现,深圳创业板市场中风投持股与否、风投声誉高低与否,都没有对企业首发定价产生显著影响,但风投持股却能显著提高股票上市首日收盘价,从而增大首发折价率。因此,在我国深圳创业板市场中,风险投资的监督筛选假说、认证功能假说不成立,但上述两种假说证伪的原因并非是存在声誉效应,而与我国股票发行制度有关。本文进一步研究发现,在发行价不存在显著差异的前提下,风投持股却能显著提升创业板公司的首发折价率,这说明风投的市场力量功能假说成立。进一步研究还发现,风投持股比例越高、参与董事会程度越高,其市场力量功能越强。

In the past twenty years, venture capitals （ VC ） have played quite important role in the growth of small and medium enterprises, and drawn the academic circles attention. How does VC influence the IPO underpricing of the enterprise＇s stocks？ That is a controversial issue, which has no final conclusion. The classical Certification Hypothesis and Monitoring Hypothesis argue that VC can decrease the information asymmetry between the enterprises and the outside investors, reducing the IPO underpricing. This hypothesis is supported by conclusions of quite many researches, while there are still a lot of conclusions against it. There are two theoretical hypothesis challenging the classical hypothesis, arguing that IPO underpricing of VC-backed companies should be larger than peers. The Grandstanding Hypothesis holds that the less skilled VC will push the enterprise go public earlier than it should be, enlarging the IPO underpricing. The Market Power Hypothesis considers that VC can raise the stock＇s secondary market price, enlarging the IPO underpricing. In this paper, we utilize a sample of 259 companies, investigate the role of venture capital in the IPO underpricing in Chinese Growth Enterprises Market, and gains several interesting conclusions different from previous studies. We find that the offering price is of no significant difference between VC-backed firms and Non VC-backed firms, while VC-backed firms can still have higher closing price of the first trading day and higher underpricing. This implies that the market power hypothesis rather than the certification hypothesis or the screening and monitoring hypothesis is supported. Our further research indicates that the share proportion and control rights of venture capitals on the firm are positively associated with the market power effect. The first part of this paper points out that there are two assumptions beneath the classical hypothesis, enough market efficiency so that the first day dosing price can reflect the stock＇s intrinsic price, and the stock ＇ s issuing price reflecting VC＇s role. We create a variable named as Relative P/E ratio （RPE） to compare the issuing pricing of VC- and non VC-backed companies, and find that VC ＇ s participation has no significant influence on stocks＇ issuing pricing. In the second part of this paper, we build an econometrical model and investigate whether VC can increase the first day closing price and the IPO underpricing. The conclusion is that although VCs cannot raise the issuing price, but they can raise the first day closing price, and the IPO underpricing, which indicates the Market Power Hypothesis holds. The third part further investigates how VC influence the IPO underpricing. The results reveal that the market power of VC is significantly positive related with VC＇s proportion of shares and boards of directors. This conclusion indicates investors in the secondary market do care about the degree that VC can exert influence on the company. The last part of this paper put forward suggestions of policy that the supervisors should guide the market power of VC to rationally lessen the information asymmetry, and improve the pricing efficiency.