地方政府公共政策执行偏离的修正路径研究——以长春市“按份共有”廉租房政策为例

Amendment of Public Policy Implementation Deviation——The Policy of Low-Rent House with Co-Ownership by Shares in Changchun City

政策执行中的中央政府与地方政府关系是一种委托代理关系,地方政府作为代理人,是具有独立利益的制度性实体,它在政策执行过程中会通过成本收益分析来确定自己的最优行动。主要运用规范研究法和实证研究法,以长春市"按份共有"廉租房政策作为案例,结合委托代理理论从信息不对称程度、激励(约束)机制等角度分析作为代理人的地方政府偏离中央政策目标的原因。从完善信息反馈制度、完善政策执行中的民主参与制度、改革地方政府绩效考核机制、强化责任追究制度、完善激励机制等制度层面设计修正路径,从而规范地方政府的代理行为。

In the implementation of policies, the relationship between the central government and local governments is a principal-agent interaction pattern. The local government, as an agent with independent interests, can determine the optimal move based on a cost-benefit analysis in the process of policy implementation. Both normative research method and empiri- cal research method are applied in this paper. Taking the example of the low-rent houses with co-ownership by shares in Changehun City, combined with the theory of agency by agreement, this paper analyzes the reasons why the local govern- ment deviates from the objectives of the central policy, from the perspective of the degree of information asymmetry and in- centive （restriction） mechanisms. At the same time, the paper discusses the design of amendment paths to regulate the ac- tion of the local government as an agent, from the aspects of perfecting information feedback system, improving democratic participation system, reforming local government performance evaluation mechanism, strengthening the accountability sys- tem and perfecting motivation mechanism.