不完全劳资契约框架下谈判能力配置对劳动者报酬的影响——兼论谈判能力的决定因素

Effects of Negotiation Ability Configuration on Labor′s Remuneration in Framework of Incomplete Labor Contract:Deciding Factors of Negotiation Ability

劳动收入份额持续下降已经成为我国经济转型中的"卡尔多非典型事实",要素投入、有偏技术进步、产业结构、全球化等因素对我国劳动收入份额的持续下降做了充分的解释,然而劳资两要素间谈判能力的大小对劳动者报酬以及劳动收入份额的影响却没有得到足够重视。事实上,初次分配中契约剩余份额的多寡是影响劳动报酬水平的主要因素。不完全劳资契约框架内,契约剩余的分享主要取决于对剩余权利的占有,并最终取决于要素谈判能力的强弱。在既定的要素禀赋结构中,要素谈判能力的高低主要受制于一定的制度环境,它和一定的制度偏向成正比。要提高劳动者的契约剩余份额、增强劳动者的谈判能力,关键是要树立偏向劳动的价值取向、建立系列偏向劳动的制度安排。

The steadily declining of the labor share has become indisputable fact of China＇s economic and so- cial development. There are many research about how factor input, biased technology, industrial structure and globalization lead to declining of China labor share. However, the effects of negotiation ability has not been given enough attention . Actually, the unbalanced distribution of residual revenue of incomplete labor contract is main manifestation of the low labor share in primary distribution. The residual revenue of labor contract has important impact on labor remuneration level in primary distribution. And the residual revenue mainly determined by alloca- tion of residual rights in the theoretical framework of incomplete labor contract, which dues to negotiating abilities of labor and capital. Furthermore, negotiating ability mainly determined by certain institutional environment in the established factor endowment structure. And negotiating ability is proportional to a modest preference institutional system. The key to raise labor＇s negotiating abilities and improve their residual revenue of labor contract is to es- tablish values and institutional arrangement bias towards labor.