期刊文献+

管理防御视角下CEO背景特征对现金持有量的影响 被引量:7

The Impact of CEO's Background Characteristics on Cash Holdings from the Perspective of Managerial Entrenchment
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摘要 本文选择CEO年龄、性别、任期、学历、专业背景和职业经历等为变量,以2007-2012年的987家上市公司为样本,探索管理防御视角下CEO背景特征与经历对公司现金持有量的影响。研究发现,在没有外部威胁的情况下,CEO任期越长和职业经历越复杂,防御程度越高,越倾向于高现金持有;高学历和具有管理学科专业背景CEO防御程度越低,越倾向于低现金持有;CEO年龄与现金持有量存在倒"U"型关系。 This paper exams the impact of CEOs' background characteristics on cash holdings from the perspective of managerial entrenchment by taking CEOs' age, gender, tenure, education degree, professional background and career experience as variables and taking the 987 listed companies from 2007 to 2012 as samples. Results show that CEO will hold higher ratios of cash when his tenure is longer and his career experience is more complex, which results in the higher degree of managerial entrenchment. CEO tends to hold lower ratios of cash when he has higher education degree and managerial profession that indicate lower degree of managerial entrenchment. We also find that there is an inverted U type relationship between CEO's age and cash holdings.
出处 《商业研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第12期62-68,共7页 Commercial Research
基金 国家社科基金重大招标项目 项目编号:11&ZD163 国家社科基金项目 项目编号:11BGL028 高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金项目 项目编号:2011009511003
关键词 管理防御 CEO背景特征 现金持有量 managerial entrenchment CEOs' background characteristics cash holdings
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参考文献13

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二级参考文献58

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