企业投资选择、环境改进与公众参与

Enterprise Investment, Environmental Improvement and Public Participation

在全球经济低碳化的大背景下,我国经济迅猛发展并转型,众多成长型企业既有环境改进投资的激励,又必然会展开市场占有率博弈。文章通过建立一个企业投资的博弈模型,分析得出由于外部性和收益率的不同,企业的不同投资激励存在很大差异。在短期预算约束下,企业出于自身效用最大化的考虑,往往更注重短期直接收益,导致环境改进投资与社会福利最优存在一定的偏差,从而使经济发展的可持续性和稳定性下降。而在政府政策引导的同时,通过公众参与、选择和舆论监督,可以对企业的投资选择施加有效影响,达到促进低碳经济发展,提高整体经济效率的目的。

Under the background of low carbonization in the global economy, China＇s economy has developed and restructured rapidly. Most growth-oriented enterprises have the investment incentive of environmental improvement, and meanwhile, they are bound to launch the game with rivals concerning the market share as well. This paper builds a game model of enterprise investment and reaches a conclusion that there are great differences in enterprise investment incentives because of dissimilarities in externality and yields. Taking utility maximization into consideration, enterprises in the short-term budget constraints usually pay more attention to direct and short- term revenue, which poses certain deviation between the environmental improvement investment and social welfare maximization. Consequently, the sustainability and stability of economy system will come down. While government＇s policy guidance, public participation, selection and supervision of public opi：aion will also exert an active influence on enterprise investment, which will promote the development of low carbon economy and improve the overall economic efficiency.