摘要
本文以上市公司(2003-2010)为样本,实证研究了公共治理目标导致政府干预企业投资行为的动因及后果。结果表明,GDP增长率越低和地方财政赤字规模越大的地区,政府干预动机越强,所辖范围内的上市公司过度投资现象越严重;就业率同企业过度投资没有显著地相关关系;国有企业受干预程度大于非国有企业。说明上市公司过度投资并不都是由代理问题引起的。
This paper studies the motives and consequences when a company invests under the intervention of the government that has a fiscal target.Employing the data of listed-companies from 2003 to 2010 from CCER and CSMAR,it indicates that companies' over-investment is positively significantly related to GDP growth rate but strongly negatively significantly related to fiscal deficits.It finds little evidence that companies' over-investment is related to employment rate.It also provides some evidence that the stated-owned listed-companies are more intervened by the government.The findings not only provide a new view of assessing the officers' performance in China,as well as indicate that agency problem is not the only reason for a company to overinvest.
出处
《财会通讯（下）》
2013年第11期69-75,129,共7页
Communication of Finance and Accounting
基金
国家社会科学基金“管理层权力、信息披露质量与投资效率实证研究”(项目编号:12CGL025)
西藏大学财经学院科研培育基金项目“管理层权力、信息披露质量与投资效率关系的实证研究”(项目编号:ZDCYPY2011003)阶段性成果
关键词
GDP增长率
就业率
财政赤字
过度投资
GDP growth rate
Employment rate
Fiscal deficit
Over-investment
