企业借款增强抑或降低盈余质量——基于外部治理环境和宏观经济政策的研究

An Analysis of the Development and Competition Inference of Internet Finance

本文在分析企业借款影响盈余质量的双重作用机理的基础上,选取2003～2011年所有A股上市公司数据,实证检验外部治理环境和货币政策对企业借贷与盈余质量两者关系的影响。结果表明:总借款、短期借款与盈余质量呈倒"U"形关系,长期借款与盈余质量负相关;外部治理环境的改善验证了投资者保护的惩罚假说,恶化了企业借款与盈余质量的关系;货币紧缩增强了银行的监督治理效果,改善了企业借款与盈余质量的关系。货币紧缩时期,银行能够识别企业的盈余质量表明改革取得初步成效,法律执行机制不健全导致外部治理环境仅起到威慑效果,意味着要深化改革。

Based on the analysis of the mechanism of dual impacts on the quality of corporate loans, this paper selects the data of all A-share listed companies during 2003N2011 to examine the relationship between external governance environment and monetary policy empirically. The conclusions of the paper are as follows： there is an inverted ＂U＂ shaped relationship between total loans or short-term loans and earnings quality, and long-term loans are negatively related to earnings quality; improve- ments in external governance environment have verified the penalty hypothesis about investor protection and worsened the rela- tionship between corporate loans and earnings quality; monetary tightening has enhanced the effects of the supervision and man- agement of banks, and improved the relationship between corporate loans and earnings quality. In the period of monetary tight- ening, banks can rec.ognize enterprise＇s earnings quality, which shows that reforms in financial sector have achieved initial re- suits. The mechanism of law enforcement is not perfect, which leads to the result that the external governance environment has only a deterrent function, so the reforms need to be deepened.