官员异地交流、政绩诉求与公司会计政策选择

Local Governors' Turnovers,Achievement Appeals and Accounting Policy Choice

本文研究了地方政府围绕GDP增长的政绩诉求如何影响公司会计政策的选择,并进一步考察了官员异地交流的制度设计在其间的调节作用。研究发现:在以GDP增长为基础的政治晋升锦标赛下,地方政府强烈的政绩诉求促使地方官员不断干预当地企业对稳健性会计政策的运用,从而降低了公司的会计稳健性;但是,中央政府制定的官员异地交流制度能通过缓解地方保护主义和削弱地方宗派主义而降低地方政绩诉求对公司会计政策选择的负面影响。本文既有助于我们更好地理解以GDP增长为基础的考核模式所存在的弊端,也有利于启示后续研究结合政治因素分析新兴市场的公司问题。

This paper investigates how the local governments' achievement appeals( LGAA) of GDP affect local firms' choosing of accounting policies,and also investigates how the relation between them is affected by the turnover of local governors( TLG). Results show,in the political promotion championships of GDP growth,the local governments severely intervene local firms' choosing to the conservative accounting policies,and lower the firms' conservatism. However,TLG can lower the negative effect of LGAA on local firms' accounting conservatism. This paper helps us to better understand the limitations of the economic mode based on the GDP growth,and enlightens future studies to investigate firm issues in the emerging markets with political incentives.