财政分权、地方财政支出偏好与城市用地规模扩张——以长三角地区为例

Fiscal Decentralization, Preference of Local Fiscal Expenditure and Scale of Urban Land Expansion——Based on a Case Study of Yangtze River Delta

文章通过利用1996-2010年长三角地区16个核心城市的面板数据,实证考察了财政分权、地方财政支出与城市用地规模扩张之间的关系。研究表明:财政分权和地方政府竞争体制使得地方政府在财政支出上存在着明显的偏向,三者均是城市用地规模扩张的主要推动因素;不同城市用地规模扩张的速度存在差异;体制因素是城市用地规模盲目扩张的深层次原因。为了从根本上改变地方政府的行为激励,需立足中国实际,完善现有的财政体制,规范中央和地方的财政收支;改革现行的政绩考核体制,保持官员任期的连续性和稳定性;要深化我国的户籍制度改革,打破居民迁移的体制壁垒,实现"用脚投票"的机制。

Through the panel date of the 16 core cities of the Yangtze River Delta from 1994 to 2006, this paper empirically analyzes the relationship among fiscal decentralization, local fiscal expenditure and the Urban Land Expansion. The study shows that fiscal decentralization and competitive system cause a clear bias towards the local governments＇ expenditure, and all of these are the main driving factors of the urban land expansion. Different cities have different expansion speeds. These problems are rooted in deep-seated institutional factors. In order to fundamentally change the behavior of the local govern- ment incentives, based on the actual situation in China, we need to improve the existing financial system, to regulate the fi- nancial revenue and expenditure of the central and local governments, and to reform the current performance evaluation sys- tem and maintain the continuity and stability of tenure of office. At the same time, we need to deepen the reform of China＇s household registration system, break the residents＇ migration institutional barriers, and finally realizes the mechanism of ＇voting with their feet＇.