房地产调控中政府行为博弈分析——中央政府和地方政府

Game Analysis between Governments in Regulation of Real Estate Market——Central Government and Local Government

自1998年我国房地产市场改革以来,房地产业迅速发展,现已成为国民经济的支柱产业,与此同时,商品房价格一路飙升,各地房价不断创下新高。面对房价飞涨,中央政府出台了一系列房地产调控政策,但房价依然居高不下,主要原因之一在于调控政策的实施受到来自各方的阻力,以地方政府最为突出。本文基于博弈视角探讨了中央政府与地方政府在房地产调控中的行为特征,在分析双方博弈动机的基础上,构建了博弈模型,进而研究了双方博弈的内在机制,得出中央政府的最优策略为严格监督地方政府对调控政策的执行,杜绝地方政府的抵制行为,而地方政府获利的行为则是抵制中央政府的各种调控政策,并且为了取得成功常常采取变相抵制措施。最后,本文分别针对中央政府和地方政府提出了政策建议,以期中央政府与地方政府能够达成合作博弈,更好地促进我国房地产行业的发展。

Since reform in 1998 in real estate market, the real estate has been developing rapidly, which has now become the pillar industry of national economy. At the same time, commercial housing prices soars, which constantly break the record. In the face of soaring house prices, central government has issued a series of real estate regulation policies. But house prices remain high. One of the reasons lies in the non-ideal implementation from all sides especially from the local government. Based on game theory perspective, the paper discusses central government and local government＇s behavior characteristics in the real estate regulation. After analysing game motivation of both sides , it does research of the internal mechanism of a two-player game bybuilding game model. It concludes that the optimal strategy for the central government is to supervise the local government＇s execution of regulation policies strictly, completely eradicating the resistance behavior of local government. While the profitable behavior for local government is to resist regulation policies in a disguised way in order to succeed. Finally , the paper puts forward political suggestions for central government and local governments respectively, wishing a cooperative game between both sides, which can promote the development of the real estate industry in our country.