良知与公共理性的道德基础

Innate Knowledge and the Moral Foundation of Public Reason

罗尔斯的公共理性涉及公民的合作意向和彼此互动的"相互性"即等利害问题,康德也曾就此问题给出过自己的证明。儒家的良知学突出个体与他人关系中的"共感":伤生若己。其中既包含着先天的同情心即对他人困境的同情和彼此援助的责任,也包含着彼此公平对待的情感面向,这一点在以往是有所忽视的,它的终极的实证根据是个体的万物一体的体悟。孔子强调人与人之间以德报德,这反映了儒家良知学之公共性的诉求,昭示其有成为构建公共理性的可能基础之一。

Similar to Kant,Rawls' doctrine of public reason involves issues such as citizens' cooperation intention and reciprocity. It has been ignored that the Confucian doctrine of liangzhi( innate knowledge) em- phasizes the 'common-sense'between the self and others: to hurt others is to hurt oneself. This contains not only the inborn sympathy( that is,the sympathy to others' predicaments),the responsibility of mutual assis- tance,but also the sentiment of treating each other in a fair way. The ultimate empirical evidence for the 'common-sense'of the personal experience is that 'all things are one body'. This Confucian position is demonstrated in Confucius' stress on 'repay a good turn with a good turn',especially 'repay an injury with straightness'. The public appeal in the Confucian doctrine of innate knowledge makes it possible to be a foun- dation for the construction of public reason.