期货交易所不完全监管、政府介入与监管权分配

Incomplete Regulation of Futures Exchange,Government Intervention and Allocation of Regulatory Rights

由于期货交易所没有内在化不完全监管的成本,使交易所监管激励不足。会员制交易所的组织结构、决策机制、会员之间的利益冲突。也会降低交易所市场监管激励。对美国期货市场政府介入之前的交易所自律监管的考察。也印证了交易所没有足够激励去选择符合全社会要求的监管水平,并且会频繁出现市场操纵等滥用行为。政府有必要以监管的方式介入期货市场,保证市场安全、稳定。政府介入期货市场的方式应主要采取借助于交易所等自律组织的混合监管模式。

As futures exchanges do not bear the total costs of re gulation incompleteness, they often lack incentives to strengthen regulation. The membership structure, decision-making mechanisms and interest conflicts among members further reduce the regulative incentives of futures exchanges. A brief review of the history of futures exchanges in the US proves the above argument. It is necessary for the government to intervene in futures market regulation to ensure market safety and stability. But for the performance of government intervene, the regulatory mode or allocation of regulatory rights is very important.