基于强化学习的农田水利设施管理进化博弈分析

Evolutionary game analysis of irrigation infrastructures management based on reinforcement learning-model

在对农田水利设施进行管理维护时,由于其公共品属性和农民个人理性,会采取搭便车策略,导致参与积极性不高.首先建立了农民参与农田水利管理的一般模型,然后通过适当的激励方式和组织形式,构建了新的管理模式.考虑农民决策的有限理性,并可以通过对周围环境的学习进行策略调整,利用基于Q-学习的进化博弈理论对农民策略的改变和合作行为进行讨论,并通过仿真实验洗明了新的管理模式不仅能够提高上、下游农民的收益,而且能够提高博弈中合作策略的出现次数.

The irrigation infrastructures are public goods, farmers will adopt free-riding strategy in the management and maintenance because of the individual rationality, and so there are only few people engage in the activity. The paper first established the normal model of farmers engaged in the activity, then designed a new manage model by appropriate incentives and organization forms. Farmers not only individual rationality but also can change them strategies by study, so the paper discussed the cooperation and strategy change of the farmers by evolutionary game based of Q-learning. At last, the simulation illustrated that the new model not only improved the income of the upstream and downstream farmers, but also can increase the degree of cooperation in the game.