“实质本体论”和“形式本体论”的宏大构想及其遗留问题——剖析胡塞尔在《大观念》中规划的“本质科学”

Grand Design of "Material Ontology" and "Formal Ontology" and Its Leaving Issues——Analyzing Husserl's "Eidetic Science" Outlined in General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology(Ideas 1)

胡塞尔提出的"哲学作为严格科学"的理念是否应被彻底抛弃呢?如果这一理念仍然值得追求的话,那么就值得反思胡塞尔在《大观念》中所规划的"实质本体论"和"形式本体论"的纲领是否还有启发意义?弄清楚这两个问题,对于理解胡塞尔后期的"生活世界"学说与其早先的哲学路线关系相当重要,对于反思胡塞尔的"先验现象学"在当代"体系哲学"重构中的价值也非常重要。

Whether should Husserl's idea of "philosophy as rigorous science" be completely abandoned? If the idea is still worth pursuing,then it is worth reflecting what instructive significances Husserl's program about "material ontology" and "formal ontology" outlined in Ideas 1 should have.Clarifying these two issues is very important for understanding the relation of later Husserl's "life-world" theory to his earlier philosophical line,and for reflecting the value of Husserl's "transcendental phenomenology" in contemporary reconstruction of "systematical philosophy".