摘要
诠释者们对柏拉图哲学中"知识"和"信念"的关系做出了不同的解释,主要有兼容论、排斥论和歧义论这三种读法。我们首先对以G.法恩(G.Fine)为代表的兼容论读法和以K.M.福格特(K.M.Vogt)为代表的排斥论读法做了一些评述,指出了它们各自的困难,然后为歧义论读法提供了一些支持和论证。想当然地认为柏拉图不同文本中的"知识"和"信念"概念有着统一的含义,这是错误的;相反,实际上《美诺》和《泰阿泰德》中的"知识"和"信念"概念与《理想国》中的"知识"和"信念"概念有着非常不同的含义。
Regarding the relationship between the Platonic concept of knowledge(episteme) and the concept of belief(doxa),interpreters have proposed basically three different readings,which can be described as inclusivism,exclusivism and "the ambiguous reading".This essay criticizes the first two readings and argues for "the ambiguous reading".The author claims that Plato actually uses the terms "knowledge" and " belief" in different ways throughout the dialogues,particularly Meno,Theaetetus and Republic,and it is misleading to represent Platonic concepts of "knowledge" and "belief" as univocal.
出处
《世界哲学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第1期24-34,160,共11页
World Philosophy