摘要
目的基于我国工伤保险实施过程中存在的问题,研究设计一种理论工伤保险框架,通过对作业工人的访问,以获得理论工伤保险的优化模型,为各级政府和相关部门提供相关信息。方法采用多阶段整群抽样的方法,首先根据经济发展水平、交通便利及相关部门配合情况选取浙江省3市(县)9家大中小型企业。然后在这9家企业中随机抽取31个车间,对整个车间的作业工人进行调查。采用面对面问卷调查方式,由事先经过培训的调查员进入车间询问,并填写问卷相关内容。结果调查发现,优化后理论工伤保险的意愿参与率从73.87%提高到80.96%,平均意愿支付从2.21%月工资(51.77元)提高到2.38%月工资(54.93元),中位数意愿支付从1%月工资提高到1.2%月工资,但从35元降到30元。理论工伤保险的优化模型为工伤保险覆盖国家及省规定的所有职业病目录及工伤事故及职业病项目咨询。保险由国家社会保障部门统一管理,全国统筹,实现跨区域移动性,消除区域差异性。保费由国家、企业、个人各承担一部分。保费收取后形成一个独立的保险基金,并进入个人终身帐户。保费无论何种原因都不能退还。职业病/32伤事故赔偿及报销将与作业工人所在单位无关,但与投保的年限有关。保险在加入1年后生效,但在工作期间发生职业伤害或意外事故,该保险将立即生效。结论理论工伤保险的优化模型真正意义上体现了跨区域移动性,消除了区域差异性,体现了公平性。在一定程度上保障了工作单位的权益及作业工人在失业状态下的健康权益。
Objective To explore an optimal model of hypothetical work injury insurance scheme, which is in line with the wishes of workers, based on the problems in the implementation of work injury insurance in China and to provide useful information for relevant policy makers. Methods Multistage cluster sampling was used to select subjects: first, 9 small, medium, and large enterprises were selected from three cities (counties) in Zhejiang Province, China according to the economic development, transportation, and cooperation; then, 31 workshops were randomly selected from the 9 enterprises. Face-to-face interviews were conducted by trained interviewers using a pre-designed questionnaire among all workers in the 31 workshops. Results After optimization of hypothetical work injury insurance scheme, the willingness to participate in the scheme increased from 73.87% to 80.96%; the average willingness to pay for the scheme increased from 2.21% (51.77 yuan) to 2.38% of monthly wage (54.93 Yuan); the median willingness to pay for the scheme increased from 1% to 1.2% of monthly wage, but decreased from 35 yuan to 30 yuan. The optimal model of hypothetical work injury insurance scheme covers all national and provincial statutory occupational diseases and work accidents, as well as consultations about occupational diseases. The scheme is supposed to be implemented worldwide by the National Social Security Department, without regional differences. The premium is borne by the state, enterprises, and individuals, and an independent insurance fund is kept in the lifetime personal account for each of insured individuals. The premium is not refunded in any event. Compensation for occupational diseases or work accidents is unrelated to the enterprises of the insured workers but related to the length of insurance. The insurance becomes effective one year after enrollment, while it is put into effect immediately after the occupational disease or accident occurs. Conclusion The optimal model of hypothetical work injury insurance scheme actually realizes cross-regional mobility of workers, minimizes regional differences, and embodies the fainaess. The proposed model will, to some extent, protect the rights and interests of enterprises, as well as the healthy rights and interests of workers when they are unemployed.
出处
《中华劳动卫生职业病杂志》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2013年第12期895-899,共5页
Chinese Journal of Industrial Hygiene and Occupational Diseases
基金
美国中华医学基金会(11-066)
浙江省重大科技专项课题(2008C13029-2)
职业病与工伤社会保险的可行性及政策(2012C35048)
关键词
工伤保险
意愿参与
中国
Work injury insurance
Willingness to participation
China