基于公共私人合作的巨灾保险市场均衡分析

Equilibrium of the catastrophe insurance market based on public-private partnership

以均值-方差效用函数为基础,构造了私人保险公司与被保险人的效用函数,考察以期望效用最大化为条件的保险市场供需情况,分析巨灾风险导致保险市场失灵的原因,并通过建模分析得出政府通过设立国家背景再保险公司、向私人保险公司支付巨灾保险业务佣金以及在资本市场发行巨灾债券的这些干预,有利于促进保险市场均衡的形成,并优化巨灾保险市场的均衡.最后通过对法国中央再保险公司和墨西哥政府发行多巨灾债券案例的分析,对上述模型结论进行了实证解释.

Recently, the rising frequency of extreme events has brought forward the question of the role of public and private sectors in the face of catastrophic risks. Based on the mean-variance expected utility function, under the condition of private insurer＇s and insured＇s expected utility maximum, the situation of the state-backed reinsurance company＇s existence and its impact on the market equilibrium was simulated. It was revealed that government interventions such as affording reinsurance services, offering commission to motivate insurers to participate, and issuing catastrophe bonds can help facilitate the disequilibrium. Finally, the case of the French and Mexican catastrophe systems was provided as an illustration to the model.